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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1957
concluded that the majority of the employees desired that no union repre-
sent them; a rather airy method of finding a labor dispute to be nonex-
istent.
The court's own statement of the facts suggests much that would have
amounted to unfair practice on the part of the employer under the terms
of the Labor Management Relations Act. In this connection it may be
worth noting -that the Fairlawn Meats decision,12 quoted at length and
heavily relied upon, was overruled by the United States Supreme Court.' s
In an event, the Atdersoz decision does not seem to afford a reliable prece-
dent.
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An important construction of a common leasehold cancellation clause
was decided in the case of Fox v. The Churngold Corp.' Plaintiff leased
a tractor under written agreement on February 1, 1954. On July 8,
1954, plaintiff received a cancellation notice and the lease was cancelled
on July 14, 1954. The cancellation clause provided:
"It is further agreed that this agreement shall cancel all previous lease
agreements between the parties and shall remain in effect for a period of
one year from the date executed and from year to year thereafter, but
may be cancelled on five (5) day's written notice from one party to the
other."
After first determining that the clause was unambiguous so that the
parol evidence rule applied,2 the court then concluded that the right to
terminate applied to the first of successive terms. The plaintiff had con-
tended that he had a non-cancellable lease for the first year and sought
damages for cancellation within the first year term.
Does a general statute create a leasehold interest? In Drugan v. Flaler3
the plaintiff had the newsstand and confectionary concession in the State
Office Building. Plaintiff was advised that her lease would not be re-
newed. Defendant wanted to give the concession to the blind under Re-
vised Code Section 5109.11. But that statute provides in part as follows:
".... the present operator shall not be removed .. "
Defendant's argument that a literal interpretation of the statute creates a
perpetual lease was rejected. The court noted that the legislature at its
"Fairlawn Meats, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 99 Ohio App. 517, 135 N.E.2d
689 (1955).
"Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc, 353 U.S. 20 (1957). Accord-
ing to the Ohio court, the facts were quite similar.
19581
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
pleasure could enact subsequent legislation to modify or terminate plain-
tiff's rights. The existing statute was construed to create for plaintiff a
tenancy at wilL4
The standard "untenantability" clause5 was construed to not exclude a
tenant from sharing in the proceeds of condemnation proceedings for
highway purposes. 6 The court opinioned that such a clause contemplates
such hazards as could be abated so as to 'be able to restore the property to
occupancy. The court noted several examples of phraseology which would
constitute a contracting away by the tenant of his right to damages -for loss
of interest in the premises." The court also set forth the rule of damages to
the tenant as the market value of the use and occupancy of the leasehold
for the remainder of the term minus the agreed rent.8
In Berner v. Gelmtan,9 the -plaintiff-tenant 'had a fire clause in the
lease which required the lessor to repair with reasonable speed and com-
plete such repairs within thirty days from the time of any such fire. There
was a fire on December 27, 1952. The lessor died testate on March 9,
1954. The plaintiff surrendered possession on October 31, 1954 and
sought damages from .the devisees for the rental value of the property
from March 9, 1954 to October 31, 1954. The plaintiff had failed to
present a claim against the estate under the claims statutes,10 hence the
action was of necessity limited to a direct action against the devisees. The
court noted that the covenant was dearly broken before the present own-
ers came .into ownership, and that performance of the covenant required
of the lessor a single act or contemporaneous acts as distinguished from
acts at different subsequent times. On this distinction the court concluded
1101 Ohio App. 368, 136 N.E.2d 754 (1956).
'Burton v. Durkee, 158 Ohio St. 313, 109 N.E.2d 265 (1952).
'74 Ohio L. Abs. 188, 139 N.E.2d 704 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
'Defined under Ohio Law in Brown v. Fowler, 65 Ohio St. 507, 523, 63 N.E. 76,
78 (1901).
"... if... the demised premises... be rendered untenantable by public authority
... and... cannot by reasonable efforts be restored to their former condition within
ninety (90) days, either the Lessor or the Lessee shall have the option of terminating
this lease by written notice to the other."
'City of Columbus v. Huntington National Bank, 75 Ohio L Abs. 215, 143 N.E.2d
874 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
An approved form would be "If the whole or any part of the demised premises
shall be taken by Federal, State, county, city, or other authority for public use, or
under a statute, or by right of eminent domain, the the lease terminates."
'Not to be confused with the damage liability of the condemning body. See Queen
City Realty Co. v. Linzell, 166 Ohio St. 249, 142 N.E.2d 219 (1957).
'Berner v. Gelman, 102 Ohio App. 319, 143 N.E.2d 605 (1956).
' OHiO REV .CODE § 2117.06-.07.
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